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Abstract 
A common belief among monetary theorists is that monetary equilibria are tenuous due to the 
intrinsic uselessness of fiat money (Wallace (1978)). In this article we argue that the 
tenuousness of monetary equilibria vanishes as soon as one introduces a small perturbation in 
an otherwise standard random matching model of money. Precisely, we show that the sheer 
belief that fiat money may become intrinsically useful, even if only in an almost unreachable 
state, might be enough to rule out nonmonetary equilibria. In a large region of parameters, 
agents’ beliefs and behavior are completely determined by fundamentals. 
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Abstract
A common belief among monetary theorists is that monetary equilibria are tenuous due
to the intrinsic uselessness of ﬁat money (Wallace (1978)). In this article we argue that the
tenuousness of monetary equilibria vanishes as soon as one introduces a small perturbation in
an otherwise standard random matching model of money. Precisely, we show that the sheer
belief that ﬁat money may become intrinsically useful, even if only in an almost unreachable
state, might be enough to rule out nonmonetary equilibria. In a large region of parameters,
agents’ beliefs and behavior are completely determined by fundamentals.
Keywords: ﬁat money, autarky, equilibrium selection
JEL Codes: E40, D83
1 Introduction
The deﬁning property of ﬁat money is its intrinsic uselessness. As pointed out by Wallace (1978), a
direct implication of this property is the tenuousness of monetary equilibria in the sense that there
always exists the possibility that ﬁat money has no current value because no one expects it to have
value in the future. In fact, any model where the frictions that explain the need for ﬁat money are
explicitly laid out and monetary equilibria exists (e.g., overlapping generations, turnpike, search)
also exhibits equilibria where money has no value at any date. These nonmonetary equilibria are
∗Michigan State University and São Paulo School of Economics/FGV.
†Centre for Economic Performance (CEP), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and São
Paulo School of Economics/FGV.
1usually viewed as natural. They are the conﬁrmation of the idea that valued ﬁat money is simply
a belief driven phenomenon.
In this paper, we argue that the tenuousness of monetary equilibria and the existence of nonmon-
etary equilibria is not as natural as one may think. In particular, we demonstrate that nonmonetary
equilibria are tenuous in the sense that a small perturbation of the intrinsic uselessness of ﬁat money
may eliminate such equilibria. Our analysis is cast in a random matching model of money along
the lines of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) modiﬁed by the assumption that there exists an arbitrar-
ily small probability that the economy reaches a state where ﬁat money acquires intrinsic value.
Under this assumption, we show that there exists a large region of parameters where a monetary
equilibrium exists but there are no nonmonetary equilibria. The idea is that merely the belief that
ﬁat money may became intrinsically useful, even if only in an almost unreachable state, is enough
to rule out nonmonetary equilibria.
Our analysis unveils a natural mapping between agents’ behavior and the fundamentals of the
economy. In a large region of parameters, agents’ beliefs and behavior are solely determined by
economic fundamentals, so arbitrary beliefs cannot play any role in selecting an equilibrium. For any
level of patience, autarky is the unique equilibrium if the ratio between the utility of consumption
and the cost of production is small and money is the unique equilibrium if the same ratio is large.
There also exists an intermediate region where the monetary equilibrium coexists with autarky,
but this region gets smaller as agents become more patient.
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. First, there are a number of papers that apply
a commodity-money reﬁnement to ﬁat money equilibria with the objective of reducing the set
of equilibria (McCandless and Wallace (1991), Zhou (2003), Zhu (2003,2005), Wallace and Zhu
(2004)). In these papers, a ﬁat money equilibrium is said to pass the reﬁnement test if it is
the limit of a sequence of commodity-money equilibria when the intrinsic value of the commodity
money converges to zero. In contrast to our work, this literature is focused on eliminating monetary
equilibria.
Second, this paper is related to the literature on equilibrium selection in coordination games.
The literature on global games (Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), Frankel, Morris and Pauzner
(2003)) shows that multiplicity of equilibria disappears once the information structure of the game
2is slightly perturbed. A related argument applies to dynamic games with complete information
where a state variable is subject to shocks (Frankel and Pauzner (2000)). Those papers assume
the existence of dominant regions and of strategic complementarities. Both assumptions hold in
this model: there exists some state where accepting money is a dominant strategy; and the use of
money intrinsically relies on coordination. However, diﬀerently from those models, here if there
are signiﬁcant gains from trade, refusing to accept money is never a dominant strategy. Thus, the
condition for a unique equilibrium is not that there exists a threshold where an agent is indiﬀerent
between two choices, but that an agent strictly prefers one choice (in our case, to accept money)
when close to a threshold.1
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model and deliver our
main result. In section 3 we present some examples and in section 4 we conclude.
2 Model
Our environment is a version of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). Time is discrete and indexed by t.
There are k indivisible and perishable goods. The economy is populated by a unit continuum of
agents uniformly distributed across k types. A type i agent derives utility u per unit of consumption
of good i and is able to produce good i + 1 (modulo k) at a unit cost of c, with u > c. Agents
maximize expected discounted utility with a discount factor β ∈ (0,1). There is also a storable and
indivisible object, which we denote as money. An agent can hold at most one unit of money at a
time, and money is initially distributed to a measure m of agents.
Trade is decentralized and agents face frictions in the exchange process. We formalize this idea
by assuming that there are k distinct sectors, each one specialized in the exchange of one good.
Agents observe the sectors but inside each sector they are anonymously and pairwise matched under
a uniform random matching technology. Each agent faces one meeting per period, and meetings
are independent across agents and independent over time. Thus, if an agent wants money he goes
to the sector which trades the good he produces and searches for an agent with money. If he has
money he goes to the sector that trades the good he likes and searches for an agent with the good.
1In this sense, the argument resembles that in Rubinstein (1989), although this is a dynamic model with complete
information and many players (as Frankel and Pauzner (2000)).
3Due to the unit upper bound on money holdings, a transaction can happen only when an agent
with money (buyer) meets an agent without money (seller).
We assume that, in any given period, the economy is in some state z ∈ Z. States evolve
according to the random process zt = zt−1 +∆zt, where ∆zt follows a probability distribution that
is independent of t, with expected value E (∆z). We further assume that there exists a state z such
that money has no intrinsic value for all z < z, and it generates a ﬂow value γ for all z ≥ z.
2.1 Benchmark
We initially consider the problem of an agent when ∆zt = 0 for all t, and the economy starts in
some state z < z. In this case, the economy never reaches a state where money has intrinsic value.
First, there always exists an equilibrium where agents do not accept money, and the economy is in
permanent autarky. Now, assume that an agent believes that all other agents always accept money.
Let V0,z be his value function if he does not have money and the state is z, and let V1,z be the
corresponding value function if he has money and the state is z. We have
V1,z = mβV1,z + (1 − m)(u + βV0,z),
and
V0,z = m[σ(−c + βV1,z) + (1 − σ)βV0,z] + (1 − m)βV0,z,
where σ ∈ [0,1] is the probability that the agent accepts money. Assume that σ = 1. This implies
that
V1,z − V0,z = (1 − m)u + mc.
It is indeed optimal to always accept money as long as −c + βV1,z ≥ βV0,z, i.e.,
β [(1 − m)u + mc] ≥ c. (1)
In summary, as long as (1) holds, the economy exhibits multiple equilibria.2
2Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) prove that there exists an equilibrium where agents accept money with probability
between zero and one. A similar equilibrium also exists here.
42.2 General Case
Throughout, we assume that
γ/(1 − β) > c. (2)
This ensures that for some large enough z, an agent will always accept money, regardless of his
belief about the behavior of other agents. For simplicity, it is assumed that γ/(1 − β) < u, which
ensures that an agent always accepts to exchange the good he values for money.
First, note that the use of money exhibits strategic complementarities. Precisely, for any pair
of states (z,z′) ∈ Z2, the agent’s payoﬀ from holding money in state z is increasing in the measure
of agents that accept money in state z′. In fact, while the ﬂow value of money is independent of
the number of agents that accept money, the exchange value of money is an increasing function of
the number of agents that also accept money.
Fix some state z ∈ Z and let φ(t) denote the probability that any state larger than z will be
reached for the ﬁrst time in period t. We are ready to present our main result.





[(1 − m)u + mc] ≥ c, (3)
then there exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, money is always accepted.
Proof. First, note that for some zM >> z, an agent will ﬁnd it optimal to accept money even
if everyone else does not. Precisely, as z → ∞, the payoﬀ of holding money if no one else accepts it
approaches γ/1−β, which is larger than the cost of getting money, c, given the assumption in (2).
Now, since the use of money exhibits strategic complementarities, it is a dominant strategy for all
agents to accept money for z > zM.
The proof is done by induction, where at each step strictly dominated strategies are eliminated.
Starting from a threshold z∗, it is shown that an agent ﬁnds it optimal to accept money at state
z∗ −1, even if money has no intrinsic value. Then it is argued that incentives for accepting money
are even larger if money has an intrinsic value.
Suppose that money has no intrinsic value and that all agents accept money if and only if
z ≥ z∗. We need to compare the payoﬀ of such an agent with the one received by someone who













where tφ denotes the period a state larger than z∗ − 1 is reached and π(z|tφ = t) denotes the
probability that the state z is reached conditional on tφ equal to t. Since no agent is accepting
money when z ≤ z∗ − 1, the money received by the agent will not be useful until a state z larger
than z∗ − 1 is reached. When a state z larger than z∗ − 1 is reached, the agent’s value function is
V1,z. The term in brackets is the average of such value functions, weighted by their probabilities.
The expected payoﬀ of an agent that accepts money equals the discounted value of such averages,
weighted by their own probabilities, minus c. Now, if an agent does not accept money at state











This implies that the agent accepts money at state z∗ − 1 as long as
V a
z∗−1 − V n







π(z∗ + i|tφ = t)[V1,z∗+i − V0,z∗+i]
￿
≥ 0. (4)
Now, since all other agents are accepting money at any state z > z∗ − 1, the value function of an
agent with money at some state z > z∗ − 1 is
V1,z = mβEzV1 + (1 − m)(u + βEzV0),
while the value function of an agent without money at some state z > z∗ − 1 is
V0,z = m(−c + βEzV1) + (1 − m)βEzV0,
where βEzV1 and βEzV0 are the expected value of holding, respectively, one and zero unit of money
at the end of the period, when the current state is z. Now, note that
V1,z − V0,z = (1 − m)u + mc. (5)
Substituting 5 into 4 yields
V a
z∗−1 − V n
z∗−1 = −c +
∞ ￿
t=1




βtφ(t)[(1 − m)u + mc] ≥ c.
This is so because
∞ ￿
i=0
π(z∗ + i|tφ = t) = 1 and (1 − m)u + mc is a constant.
The above reasoning has been done assuming that agents will not accept money at states smaller
than z∗, but if that were not the case, incentives for holding money would only increase, owing
to the strategic complementarities in using money. Hence, if condition (3) holds, accepting money
at state z∗ − 1 is a strictly dominant strategy given that all agents are accepting money at states
larger or equal to z∗ and money has no intrinsic value.
Now, if money has intrinsic value γ for some z ≤ z∗, then the diﬀerence V a
z∗−1 −V n
z∗−1 can only
increase. In fact, while the expression for V n
z∗−1 is the same as above, the expression for V a
z∗−1 has
to be modiﬁed to include the positive utility ﬂow from holding money. So, condition (3) suﬃces
to rule out not accepting money at z∗ − 1 if all agents are accepting money if z ≥ z∗, regardless of
whether we are in a region where money has intrinsic value.
As (i) it is a strictly dominant strategy to accept money if z ≥ zM, and (ii) for all z∗, if all
agents accept money whenever z ≥ z∗, accepting money at z = z∗ −1 is a strictly dominant strat-
egy, accepting money is the only strategy that survives iterative elimination of strictly dominated
strategies.
Under the belief that everyone will always accept money, an agent ﬁnd it optimal to accept
money if the cost of producing the good (c) is smaller than the beneﬁt (u(1−m)+mc) discounted
by the discount rate β, because money can only be used in the next period (condition (1)). The
condition for the monetary equilibrium being the unique equilibrium in the model (equation (3))
substitutes the discount factor β by a weighted average of βt for all t. The weights come from the
following exercise: assuming that at time 0 the economy is at state z∗ − 1, and everyone accepts
money at states z ≥ z∗, the weight of βt is the probability of reaching a state where money is
accepted at time t (and not before). If that condition holds, there cannot be a threshold z∗ such
that money is accepted only if z ≥ z∗, because agents would ﬁnd it optimal to accept money at
state z∗ − 1.
Owing to the intrinsic value of money in some states of the economy, there exists a range of
7parameters such that holding money is a dominant strategy. This dominant region rules out beliefs
that autarky is an equilibrium at all states: in the worst case (for money), there will be a threshold
such that money is accepted only if the economy is above that threshold. That is the only part of
the argument where the intrinsic value of money plays an important role. Then, if condition (3)
holds, that allows us to rule out autarky at every state by iterative deletion of strictly dominated
strategies. There is no mention of the intrinsic value of money in condition (3) because autarky
is ruled out even at states where the expected discounted value of the intrinsic value of money is
zero.
Remark 1 Proposition 1 holds even if the probability that z is ever reached is arbitrarily small.
The probability that z will ever be reached depends on the stochastic process of ∆z. If the
expected value of ∆z is non-negative, z will eventually be reached with probability 1 regardless of
how far z0 is from z. In contrary, if E (∆z) is negative, then the probability that z will ever be
reached depends on how far z0 is from z. If this distance is large enough, the probability that z
can ever be reached is arbitrarily small.
Such long term probabilities are not important in the computation for the condition of a unique
equilibrium in (3). All that matters for that condition is the probability φz (t) of reaching a nearby
state in the following periods, while the discount rate is still not too low. Hence, two very similar
stochastic processes, one with E (∆z) = 0 and another with a slightly negative E (∆z) will yield a
very similar condition for a unique equilibrium, although the diﬀerence between the probabilities
of ever reaching z can be arbitrarily close to 1.3
3 Examples
In order to make easy the comparison between conditions (1) and (3), it is worth rewriting (3) as
λβ [(1 − m)u + mc] ≥ c (6)
3Under the usual assumption of common knowledge of rationality, the distance between the current state z0 and
z can be disregarded from the analysis. That distance could have some eﬀect on the conditions if boundedly rational
agents were not able to think too far ahead, for example.
8so that the only diﬀerence between the condition for existence of a monetary equilibrium in (1) and





λ is a number between 0 and 1. λ = 0 means that autarky is always an equilibrium, while λ = 1
implies that autarky can only be an equilibrium if the monetary equilibrium does not exist.
3.1 Binary process
Consider a simple stochastic process where
Pr(∆z = 1) = p and Pr(∆z = −1) = 1 − p.
Departing from state z∗ − 1 in period 0, the probability of reaching state z∗ in period 1 is p.
Otherwise, the economy moves to state z∗−2. Then, state z∗ can only be reached in period 3. The
stochastic process until state z∗ is reached is illustrated in Figure 1. The probabilities that state
z∗ will be reached at time t are given by




and φ(2i) = 0 for all i ≥ 0. The formula for φ(2i + 1) resembles a binomial distribution, but the











3.1.1 The case p = 0.5













which is a function of β only. Figure 2 shows λ as a function of β. The factor λ depends on the
discounted sum of probabilities that state z∗ will be reached when departing at time 0 from z∗ −1.
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Figure 1: Binary process
10Figure 2: Binary process, p = 0.5
period. The probabilities that z∗ will be reached after 3, 5 or more periods are not important if β
is small. But as β approaches 1, the discounted sum of probabilities that state z∗ will be reached
approaches the sheer probability that the economy will at some point be at z∗, and if p = 0.5, that
probability is 1. As β approaches 1, the region where the only equilibrium is the monetary one
converges to the region where the monetary equilibrium exists. Thus agents’ behavior is completely
determined by fundamentals and sunspots play no role.
Figure 3: Binary process, p = 0.5
The conditions for existence and uniqueness for a monetary equilibrium in (1) and (3), respec-
tively, depend on β, m, u and c. Normalizing c = 1 and assuming m = 1/2, which maximizes
11the amount of exchanges, the possible equilibria are drawn in ﬁgure 3. The dotted curve depicts
the condition for existence of a monetary equilibrium and the full curve shows the condition for
the monetary equilibrium being unique. Below the dotted curve, autarky is the only equilibrium,
between both curves both autarky and the monetary equilibrium exist, and above the full curve
autarky cannot be an equilibrium. Autarky is not an equilibrium if the ratio u/c is large enough.
If β is crucially determined by the frequency agents meet, then if agents meet often enough (β is
high) and there are gains from trade (u
c is larger than one), money will arise in equilibrium.
Figure 4: Binary process
3.1.2 The case p < 0.5
Assume now that p = 0.5−ε. For a suﬃciently small ε, a value of λ very similar to that implied by
(8) would be obtained, but the probability that z would ever be reached could be made arbitrarily
close to 0 for some z0. For lower values of p, the factor λ is given by equation (7). Figure 4 shows
the relation between β and λ for diﬀerent values of p. As before, as β approaches 0, λ approaches
p. However, as β approaches 1, λ does not approach 1 since there is a positive probability, bounded
away from zero, that z∗ will never be reached by a process departing from z∗ − 1. The factor λ is
still increasing in β, owing to the fact that the late arrivals at z∗ are worth more for larger β.
123.2 Normal random walk
The analysis up to now has considered a discrete state space, but the results are easily extended
to a continuous state space, when z can be any real number. Suppose the economy in period 0 is
at state z∗ and denote by ϕ(t) the probability that a state z ≥ z∗ will be reached at time t, and
not before (after t = 0). An argument identical to 1 yields the following condition for a unique
equilibrium:






[(1 − m)u + mc] > c,
which is a version of (3) with ϕ(t) instead of φ(t). While in the discrete case we need to consider
the probability that state z∗ will be reached if we depart from z∗ − 1, in the continuous case we
consider the probabilities of reaching z∗ when the economy starts at a state that is arbitrarily close
to z∗. If at that state not accepting money is not optimal, then the iterative process of elimination





Figure 5 compares the relation between λ and β for a binary process and a normal process assuming
E(∆z) = 0 in both cases. The probabilities ϕ(t) for the normal case are obtained from Monte Carlo
simulations. While the main characteristics of the curves are the same, the factor λ is higher when
∆z follows a normal stochastic process. Intuitively, it is “easier” to arrive at a state larger than z∗
13starting at (or close enough to) z∗ and following a normal random walk than starting at z∗ −1 and
following a binary process.
4 Conclusion
A widely held view among monetary theorists is that monetary equilibria are tenuous due to
the intrinsic uselessness of ﬁat money (Wallace (1978)). In contrast, nonmonetary equilibria are
resilient, and their existence underpins the fact that valued ﬁat money is purely a belief driven
phenomenon. In this article we argue that tenuousness of monetary equilibria and the resilience
of nonmonetary equilibria vanishes as soon as one introduces a small perturbation in an otherwise
standard random matching model of money. We have chosen to present our analysis in a random
matching model along the lines of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) due to its tractability. However, we
believe that our message is more general than that. More speciﬁcally, we conjecture that related
results can be obtained in any environment with a region where accepting money is a dominant
strategy, no matter how unlikely reaching this region is.
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